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{1} I feel strongly that the great fundamentals should be discussed more in all public
meetings, and also in meetings of schools and colleges. Not only the students[,] but
also the faculty should get down to more thinking and action about the great
problems[,] which concern all countries and all peoples in the world today, and not
let the politicians do it all and have the whole say.
{2} I have often been told that it is not the function of music (or a concert) to
concern itself with matters like these. But I do not[,] by any means agree. I think that
it is one of the things that music can do, if it happens to want to, if it comes
naturally, and is not the result of superimposition - I have had some fights about this.
(1)
{3} In The Fourth of July, American composer Charles Ives depicted the musical clash of two marching
bands approaching each other at a Fourth of July celebration, by superimposing two patriotic tunes upon each
other simultaneously. As the bands grow nearer to each other during the performance, the clash of the two
compositions becomes a great discordant whole. Ives, a successful businessman, in addition to being an
innovative and irreverent composer, held New England transcendentalist views. He was not afraid of leaving
complex matters in their complex state, believing it a mistake to simplify the necessarily complex.(2) Some
of Ives' compositions were intentionally unperformable; his urge to compose often resulted in a musical
intellectual exercise unintended for performance reality.(3)
{4} Music copyright law today resembles an Ivesian clash of new and old rules being superimposed upon
each other. The challenge to copyright law precipitated by evolving digital forms of works and
communication shows clearly in musical works and musical works performance copyright. Musical works
performance is an intangible right, and given the inherently ephemeral nature of musical performance,
historical rules protecting this right tend to focus not on the performance itself, but on concrete tests and
factors, like place of performance, identity of the performer, manner of delivery, and fixation of a
performance. This focus on concrete factors allows for some flexibility when technological change occurs in
the manner of reproduction and delivery of performances, as long as the geographic model identifies the who,
when, and/or where of the performance. However, all of these rules and rights supported by concrete tests,
are challenged when the musical work, performance medium, or delivery system exist in digital form.
{5} Today, neither the live performance model and rules, nor the broadcast model for performance and rules,
adequately addresses musical works performance on the Internet. While some contexts for musical works
performances mimic either the live performance or broadcast models in place prior to the digital age, the
Internet is a truly unique phenomenon that allows for flexibility and innovation in the delivery of musical
works and their performances. Using the Internet today, a listener can experience music, sounding as if it
were being performed in real-time in "webcasts"(4) or other forms of real-time audio like "streaming."(5)
Musicians may present live concerts via the Web.(6) Individuals and businesses may use music as a
component of their websites as well. Additionally, music may be downloaded simultaneously with a
performance or separately delivered. Musicians may collaborate on the Web, composing new music,
jamming, or otherwise performing preexisting music. Libraries are now archiving musical works.(7) Musical
works sites already exist where users can obtain sheet music.(8) Of course, small and large music retailers,
record labels, and other commercial outlets are offering musical works via their websites.(9) Clearly, even
amongst these uses, and the many more that do or will soon exist,(10) there is a need to protect the rights of
owners of musical works copyrights when they warrant protection. Protection is not as clear when the
musical uses are performances under either the new or older copyright provisions.
{6} An "Ivesian clash" in copyright rules is occurring because under the existing rules for musical works
performance, it is possible to credibly argue that almost all transmissions involving music through the use of
the Internet are public performances, requiring the payment of a royalty.(11) Potentially, the royalties at stake
are significant; current projections estimate that Internet music use will continue to escalate.(12) Credible
arguments and questions exist, however, regarding apparent contradictions over what is a digital performance
within the music copyright provisions themselves, what policy is being served by such an all-encompassing
view, and how music performance models actually work in the Internet environment. The arguments do not
fit either the live performance, or the traditional broadcast model in many significant ways.
{7} This paper sets out the main arguments and considerations concerning musical works performance. In it,
the argument is presented that the musical works performance right should be less broad than the
performance rights societies assert, in order to avoid the collapse of musical copyright categories, and to best
ensure fair use and public access to musical works performance.
A. Musical Works Performance Copyright Historically
{8} Although musical works were first protected in the United States in 1831,(13) the statutorily-ensured
performance right did not officially come under copyright protection until 1897.(14) In the 1909 Copyright
Act, the performance right for musical works survived intact, but a "for-profit" requirement was added. This
requirement limited the scope of the right to situations where the music user charged an admission fee for the
performance, or was a "for-profit" business using music.(15) In these early years, the performance
contemplated under the 1909 Act was live performance, either in concert halls, or other public venues. Then,
as now, technological change brought questions over who and what could perform a musical work.
Ultimately, through a series of complex cases, the performance context expanded to include broadcasters of
radio and television programs as performers.(16)
{9} The problem of defining venue, and determining whether the performance was considered public,
became further complicated by the broadcasters' ability to transmit, re-transmit, or further transmit a
performance by radio waves alone, wires, or any combination of broadcast technology then in use. The
multiple performance doctrine emerged so that a subsequent transmission of a musical work, even by a
person apparently receiving the work on a receiver, and playing or further transmitting the work in public,
was a potentially infringing performance. This doctrine was eroded by several important U.S. Supreme Court
cases.(17) By the last of these cases, it was again unclear exactly when, how, and by whom a performance
could take place, and in what context technology would be a performer or purveyor of performances subject
to licensing fees.
{10} These issues were settled by the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, which included broad definitions of
"perform" and "transmit".(18) Congress specifically intended that the multiple performance doctrine be
reinstated, and made clear that further transmission of a radio broadcast of musical works qualifies as
"performing", in its passage of Section 110.(19) In its decision to balance the needs of music copyright
owners against business users of music, Congress took into account the then current licensing practices of the
American Society for Composers and Publishers ("ASCAP"), which was embroiled in a lawsuit against
Muzak and other background music services during the time the legislation was written.(20) Ultimately,
Congress decided to restore the multiple performance doctrine.(21)
{11} Under the 1976 Act, the multiple performance doctrine has been interpreted broadly, encompassing
many different categories of musical works performance transmissions.(22) With each change in technology,
lawsuits arise over the liability of the transmitter for delivery of the performance. In particular, the
performance rights collections societies charge that, with each new mode of delivery, copyright owners of
music are threatened with the loss of royalty income.
B. Performance Licensing Societies
{12} When the performance right became protected under the federal act, the pursuit of public performance
royalties was not itself a big business.  In those days, music publishers were attempting to hawk music
without the benefit of mass media and mass distribution, and they felt that performance of music would
stimulate sheet music sales -- the primary source of musical works income at the time.(23) Further, because
the 1909 Copyright Act added a "for-profit" requirement to the musical works performance right, (24) there
existed a general perception that, unless an admission fee were charged to hear a performance, no
performance license was required.(25) In fact, sheet music copies often carried a printed notice allowing the
music user to perform the work in public.(26) Therefore, it was not unusual for a music user to expect that, if
he had a copy of the music, then he was entitled to perform it. Many musicians were unaware of the need for
separate compensation for the performance royalty.
{13} The conceptual problem of creating respect for musical works performance rights still exists today. It is
difficult to conceive of performance as a copy of the music, given that performance is not a physical
reproduction or fixation of the work.(27) Owners of copyrights, therefore, have had an historical interest in
educating music users about the differences in rights between the use of music in physical and non-physical
copies.
{14} In addition to their historical ignorance of this distinction, groups of music users, like restaurants and
hotels, resented paying performance royalties for uses of music in their establishments. They claimed the use
should be free, implying that the non-physical copy of music produced in their establishment did not have a
monetary worth, although the physical manifestation of the same music was worth a fee. This was especially
true when the restaurant did not charge an admission fee for the music and was already paying the musicians
to perform.(28) It took years of fighting and litigation to clarify that live and broadcast musical works
performances require a license, when the venue or entity rendering the performance is a "for-profit" business,
even if the listening public does not pay to experience the music performance.(29)
{15} Representatives of the newly-formed ASCAP, a performance rights collection society composed of
songwriter members, successfully led much of this fight.(30) In addition to educating music users regarding
payment for musical works performance, ASCAP assumed the task of collecting royalties for musical works
performance, devising and implementing a system of licenses and collection methods.(31) With this sustained
effort, more music users began paying for musical works performances; but, along with ASCAP's successes,
came controversy.
{16} In 1940 and 1941, Broadcast Music Incorporated ("BMI") formed and incorporated, in part as a reaction
to ASCAP's abuse of unchallenged power to set rates for music performances in the U.S.(32) Although BMI
was owned by broadcasters, and operated differently than ASCAP, eventually both ran afoul of antitrust laws.
Today, they both operate under consent decrees designed to eliminate the possibility that either can fix prices
for musical performance by offering licensing schemes that are not truly market-based.(33) As a result of the
consent decrees, both ASCAP and BMI must grant only non-exclusive, non-dramatic performance licenses,
make their repertory public, identify owners of music, offer similar licenses at the same rate for similarly-
situated users, and, for ASCAP, the decree mandates that an Article III Court serve as arbitrator of disputes.
However, despite all of this, the societies remain shielded from real price competition. While seeming to
stand as checks on the societies' pricing policies, because the decrees do not force the societies to offer per-
use licenses, and do not affect the blanket licensing regime, the decrees further legitimize the societies'
pricing power.(34)
{17} Music users' resentment and distrust of the performance rights societies is further exacerbated by the
societies' enforcement practices. Both, ASCAP and BMI send undercover representatives into establishments
using publicly-performed music who listen and make notations of songs that they believe to be within the
societies' repertory.(35) If the performer and/or establishment does not have a license, the societies will often
send a letter, or series of letters, claiming copyright infringement and offering to sell a license. If there is no
response, or a negative response is forthcoming, the societies may begin litigation to enforce the copyright,
sometimes without informing the alleged infringer of any available alternatives, under either the consent
decrees, or the Copyright Act.(36) This kind of behavior is, in itself, a violation of the consent decrees.(37)
{18} Some of the corporate music users' concerns are now addressed in the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act
of 1998,"(38) which exempts smaller restaurants and establishments hosting musical performances from
copyright liability under Section 110(5), and adds a new procedure for determining reasonable license fees
for owners of proprietors of larger eating and drinking establishments who must pay performance fees.(39)
Predictably, ASCAP and BMI were not pleased with the passage of the new act.(40) However, the act is
clearly limited to certain proprietors of establishments; others, specifically broadcasters, are excluded(41)
Against this criticism, the performance rights societies continue to defend themselves by reminding music
users that infringing performances of music constitute theft, and without the societies, there would be no
practical way for musical works copyright owners to enforce their copyrights and collect their royalties. (42)
Collective licensing is actually particularly appropriate to rights enforcement in music and music
performance because there are many musical works at issue. It would be unmanageable for music users to
find and to negotiate with copyright owners individually. Price discrimination amongst similarly-situated
users would actually be greater. Additionally, individual copyright owners cannot effectively enforce their
copyrights worldwide or domestically.(43) Finally, blanket license fees are negotiated with representative
industry groups, not set in a vacuum by the societies. (44) Therefore, the societies contend that they are
champions of the musicians, rather than cloak and dagger operatives preying on unsuspecting music users.
(45)
{19} Given that musicians do benefit from the collective administration of their performance rights, one
might not expect resentment of the societies from the writers themselves. This is especially true of ASCAP,
which is governed by its membership. However, resentment from writers does occur, primarily because of
perceptions that the societies are run by a select few who cater to already successful, or politically powerful
writers and publishers within the organization. Writers' main complaints are: (1) the ASCAP statistical
sampling system unfairly advantages mainstream writers; (2) already successful music is more easily
recognizable by ASCAP experts listening for ASCAP repertory; (3) the ASCAP sampling system does not
pay the correct percentage to rights' holders because the amount paid is not based upon the exact number of
performances played at a venue; (4) the owner or arranger of a public domain song receives less royalty than
the writer of an original song; (5) the system favors radio stations that pay higher fees to ASCAP because
licensees who pay higher fees are more likely to be surveyed for royalties; (6) even though ASCAP is a
member-run organization, it is controlled by its board because a writer who does not get royalties cannot
vote; and (7) although ASCAP must follow its distribution formulas, there is no mandate that it must
distribute a particular percentage of its income, so that money is spent on lawsuits and other activities that
some writers believe should be distributed in royalties.(46)
{20} In spite of the criticisms and problems with the collectives, they remain the easiest method for writers
and publishers to use for royalty collection, and the power of the societies remains effectively unchallenged.
While the notion of collective administration of musical works performance on the Internet is appealing, the
Internet also challenges the performance rights societies' power over the administration of music rights in the
Internet environment because it is a new media that defies easy categorization. Predictably, as the digital age
became reality, the performance rights societies laid claim to any possible music performance territory on the
Internet, even before it was clear whether such rights actually existed. 
  
  
II. Musical Works Performance on the Internet: Not All Transmissions Constitute Public
Performances, Regardless of Whether a Copy of the Musical Work is Delivered
Simultaneously with the Transmission
{21} By the early 1990's, the U.S. Government's recognition and interest in promoting a national digital
information agenda, and the music industry's progress lobbying for a series of bills protecting music in digital
environments set the stage for a continuing debate over protection of musical works on the Internet.(47) The
debate over musical works performance rights emerged clearly during the comment stages for both the
National Information Infrastructure ("NII")(48) Initiative and the Digital Performance Rights in Sound
Recording Act ("DPSRA"). As a result of the 1994-96 debate, the performance rights societies, and ASCAP,
in particular, successfully advocated the position that all transmissions of musical works over the Internet, if
public, are public performances of the musical work, even if the same transmission is a reproduction and/or
distribution of the work.(49) To date, this position has not been successfully challenged, and is regarded as
the most compelling interpretation of the matrix of old and new copyright law defining musical works
performance rights in the digital arena.(50)
{22} Consequently, the performance rights societies are actively promoting Internet performance licenses, by
direct education and persuasion of Internet users of musical works, and by electronic monitoring of music
and music users.(51) At its core, the ASCAP argument(52) developed to counter the proposal contained in the
Green and White Papers, and the proposed NII Act that distinguished between transmissions of reproduced
copies of works and transmissions of performances or displays of works.(53) Under the proposal, a musical
work sent over the NII would not be considered performed or displayed unless it were capable of being sent
as a copy and simultaneously rendered as a performance.(54) This proposal makes sense only if the
definitions of "distribution" in Section 106, and "transmit" in Section 101, are redefined to include
distribution of copies by transmission. This is impossible under the present Act's definitions, which limit
transmissions to performances and displays.(55)
{23} Similarly, the present Act limits distributions to physical copies. According to the authors of the White
Paper, if the definitions were changed, a transmission of copyrighted work could be a reproduction, and a
distribution by way of transmission, thus, implicating two separately-licensable rights. This would avoid the
collapse of the previously-separable categories of reproduction, by copying and distribution under the Act.
(56)
{24} The White Paper's proposed definitions rest upon the assumption that there are differing types of
transmissions possible on the Internet, and that the intent of the transmitter can be used to further categorize
the copyright right involved. Originally, the Green Paper specifically proposed the primary purpose test to be
determinative of the copyright rights implicated when a transmission could send a performance, display, and
reproduction by transmitted distribution, as redefined. In such a case, the reproduction right would only be
triggered if the effect or primary purpose of the transmission was to deliver a copy, or phonorecord of the
work.(57) In other words, the performance right would not be triggered if the sender primarily intended, or
purposefully effectuated distribution of a musical work as an identifiable copy, distinguished from situations
where the sender intended that the work not be copied, or merely transmitted the work for listening, without
being concerned with whether the recipient could copy the work via the transmission.
{25} Although the White Paper did not explicitly include the primary purpose test in its final version, its
proposed definitions remained. This caused the performance rights societies concern. They quickly claimed
that such definitions would unfairly deprive owners of musical works, primarily publishers, of performance
royalties that should be collected for Internet music use.(58) This supposed deprivation would occur if some
transmissions of musical works were not subject to performance licensing because the primary purpose of the
transmission was to send a reproduction or copy by phonorecord. Such a transmission would require a
mechanical or other reproduction license under Section 106(1) or Section 115, and the performance societies
could not collect performance royalties on the musical work itself. Ironically, the societies were in the tricky
position of arguing that almost all transmissions of musical works implicate the performance right under
Section 106(4), while also arguing, in their general support of the DPSRA, that under the proposed new
Section 115 in the DPSRA, reproductions of musical works could be transmitted by digital distribution
subject to a mechanical royalty. This impliedly agreed with the White Paper position that physical copies can
be distributed by transmissions.(59) Further, the performance rights societies had to agree with the record
industry to support a new performance right for certain digital transmissions of sound recordings, contained
in Section 114 of the DPSRA, to preserve their potential market for performance royalties of musical works
involved in those transmissions.(60) In order to preserve these potential performance royalties, the DPSRA
specifically provides that none of the rights regulated (or governed) affects performance royalties under
Section 106(4).(61)
{26} ASCAP focused on the need to preserve the status quo, by arguing that the proposed White Paper
changes, taken together with the passage of the DPSRA, would upset the carefully-created existing balance of
industry practice and categorization of rights under existing law. Changing the law, as was proposed in the
White Paper would "do violence to the very fabric of the music industry and the needs and expectations of
creators and copyright owners of music."(62) It argued that no further changes to the Act were necessary to
protect performance rights on the Internet, as long as the presently- recognized categories were kept intact,
and the concept that musical works performances could be simultaneously performed and distributed by
digital transmission was clearly understood as pre-existing.(63)
{27} Stressing the 1976 Act's careful balance resulting from the 1909 Act history and the ensuing problems
over the multiple performance doctrine, ASCAP pointed to Congress' intentionally-broad 1976 Act
definitions of "perform" and "transmit", designed to allow for, and actively encourage the technological
advances now occurring on the Internet.(64) At the heart of the ASCAP argument that transmissions of
musical works must always be performances is the assumption that, because the 1976 Act's definition of
"performance" includes performance by different devices that can occur through the use of multi-stage
processes, the delivery of musical works performance over the Internet must always follow either a live or
broadcast-like transmission model for performing. Therefore, a receiving computer can "capture" a
performance for play at the user's preferred time through its retrieval and storage functions.(65) ASCAP
argues that, even though the information containing the musical work is transmitted digitally, requiring the
capturing computer to convert the work to audible sound, it is essentially no different than the process
occurring when a radio broadcaster transmits radio waves through the air, to be picked up by capturing
radios, which convert the waves to audible sound. This is the traditional broadcast model.(66) Under this
view, it makes no difference when and where the ultimate rendering of the work occurs, under existing
performance rights law, as broadcasters and radio players are performers.(67)
{28} Because existing cases hold that various types of technologies are used to effectuate performances, the
specific technology used for Internet transmissions is immaterial as to the determination that a performance is
occurring.(68) The fact that the performance is not heard when it is transmitted, even for a live feed of a
broadcast, or a broadcast of a live performance, does not negate the fact that the performance has taken place.
Under existing law, only the fact that the performance is transmitted is necessary to trigger the performance
right, even if the performance is not actually heard contemporaneously with the transmission. Nor does it
matter whether the performance is or is not heard later after being stored or recorded by the recipient or
another broadcaster for later replay.(69) ASCAP argues that the storage and later replay of a performance is
merely another step in the original transmission process, which may or may not actually deliver the
performance to the recipient.(70)
{29} Similarly, under the 1976 Act definitions and existing case law, the performance audience does not have
to be located in one place, nor does it have to hear the performance at the same time. As a result, ASCAP
took the position that any transmission of musical works over the Internet, which could potentially reach
members of the public, resulting in an immediate or delayed audible rendering of the musical work,
constitutes public performing of the works.(71) Because public users of the Internet have the ability to
interact with the system and to retrieve musical works at any time, perhaps choosing to play the work,
ASCAP further concluded that, both the system and users render and perform the musical works. Further,
because the service is communicating works beyond the place of the original sending, and sounds may
immediately or eventually be received, ASCAP concluded that all of the steps in a transmission are public
performances.(72) Under this interpretation, it is difficult to imagine how a transmission would not be a
public performance, because all the steps along the way that make the transmission occur are open to public
access and capture, unless otherwise affirmatively protected. However, ASCAP suggests that private e-
mailings of musical works would not be public performances.(73)
{30} While technically credible, the ASCAP argument that musical works transmissions are always
performances on the Internet did not alone answer the threat posed by the Green Paper's primary purpose test.
Under the test, even if ASCAP succeeded in selling its view that a particular musical works performance
occurred, it could not avoid the problem it created by its support of the DPSRA's recognition that identifiable
copies of musical works can be digitally delivered under Section 115. Therefore, the DPSRA allows
distribution of physical reproductions of musical works by transmission, in apparent contradiction to the 1976
Act and ASCAP's own position that the definition of distribution is limited to physical copies. The DPSRA
then increased the possibility of reviving the primary purpose test, to determine which rights require
compensation to a copyright owner, in the event that both, a reproduction and a performance of a musical
work occurred in the same transmission. Because it is impossible to determine the primary purpose of a
transmission, ASCAP argued that both rights should be recognized and compensated, otherwise a loss of
performance revenue from the presumed performance of a work would occur.(74)
{31} ASCAP was afraid that if physical reproductions of works could be distributed simultaneously to a
claimed performance taking place in the same transmission, only the mechanical license fee under Section
115 would be paid to publishers and writers. The performance rights societies cannot collect such fees.(75)
ASCAP's argument that two or more rights in a copyright owner's bundle are implicated in a single
transmission, and require compensation for all of the rights involved, was reiterated in its Reply Comments.
(76) ASCAP continued to insist that all transmissions of musical works on the NII continue to constitute
performances emphasizing that this would be true whether or not such transmissions also constitute
reproductions or displays. To add credibility to its position, ASCAP posed a question to music professionals:
why point-to-point sale of music by transmission of a sound recording containing a musical work, not audible
during transmission, would be a performance of the work when a face-to-face sale of the sound recording
would not. According to the Reply, music professionals answered that a face-to-face sale does not require
works to be performed, but a transmission does.(77) ASCAP, and the other performance rights societies, on
the basis of these unchallenged arguments, proceeded to quickly develop experimental Internet performance
licenses. Without any effective challenge, the societies individually decided that the venue of a performance
must include websites, which are analogous to broadcasters, to accommodate Internet uses.(78) This means
that anyone, from an online service provider, to a child with a webpage, is potentially performing music, and
potentially infringing on copyright, unless he has a website blanket license from a society.(79) ASCAP's idea
is that webpages serve as pathways to information, and that music is used on parts, or on all of the pathways
employed in a website.(80)
{32} At first, ASCAP developed a license with four options, requiring website music users to pay yearly fees
based on the site's total gross revenue, music revenue, ASCAP music revenue, or, for non-profit
organizations, based upon the total budget.(81) Without identifying a negotiating group similar to the groups
identified, that negotiated rates for pre-Internet performance licenses, in 1996, ASCAP charged a minimum of
$500.00 per year for any of these licenses.(82) Today, ASCAP and BMI offer a second generation of website
musical works performance licenses. The Society of European State Authors and Composers ("SESAC") also
offers a license. (83)
{33} ASCAP's Internet site offers easy methods for setting rates and purchasing a license, along with
information about why music performance licenses for the Internet are necessary, and who must purchase a
license. In its website section, entitled "Frequently Asked Questions About Internet Licensing," ASCAP
continues to hold that, "every Internet transmission of a musical work constitutes a public performance of that
work." (84) ASCAP also continues to insist that all unlicensed users of ASCAP repertory on the Internet are
infringers, saying, "obviously, it is far less expensive to comply with the copyright law by taking an ASCAP
license than to pay damages for violating the law." (85) These second generation licenses, which do not differ
much from the first version, (86) received praise as a model for handling copyrights on the Web. (87) Bennett
Lincoff, ASCAP Director of Legal Affairs for New Media said the new licenses truly reflect the value of
music online. (88) However, the fact that new licenses now cost a minimum fee of only $250.00 per year, or
half of the original charge, illustrates exactly how arbitrary rate-setting for these licenses may be. Of course,
there is still no established way to identify and to negotiate with a representative group of Web music users.
(89) ASCAP has already distributed performance royalties for online music to its members, a tribute to its
success in marketing on-line performance rights for musical works, using the reasoning outlined above. 
  
  
III. Why All Transmissions of Musical Works on the Internet Are Not Public Performances,
Regardless of Whether a Copy of the Musical Work is Delivered Simultaneously with the
Transmission
{34} ASCAP's argument imposes the current 1976 Act definitions and performance rights jurisprudence,
based upon either a live performance and/or analog broadcast model of "performance," "performer," "venue,"
"public," and "transmission," terms often defined geographically, on the non-geographic digital world.
ASCAP would like to keep the musical works performance rights category artificially separate from the rights
of reproduction and display, instead of relying upon traditionally-fixed categories of musical works and
delivery systems to self-define the digital mix. In fact, the new rules passed to protect music on the Internet
were intended to leave the musical works performance right as it is, while protecting new performance rights
in sound recordings, and further protecting against digital piracy of musical works contained in phonorecords.
{35} Given the complexity of the law, the accelerating pace of technological progress, and the nature of
musical performance, it is tempting to accept the apparent logic of the ASCAP argument, rather than to
identify the harm in accepting this view. However, if all transmissions of music on the Internet are potentially
public performances, several levels of problems are created. First, the ASCAP position fails to account for
definitional and conceptual problems creating a collapse of Section 106 categories. Second, traditional,
existing live performance and analog broadcast licensing models do not always work in the Internet context.
Third, not all forms or deliveries of digital musical works are alike. Fourth, the ASCAP argument fails to
account for the balances and limitations on copyright owners' rights mandated under the 1976 Act, including
the Section 110 exemptions and fair use. It similarly does not allow for resolution of copyright policy with
communications policy, free speech and privacy concerns, or copyright as trade law. Musicians and the
general music user public may suffer harm from the overprotection of musical works performance at the
expense of public access, recognition and flexibility of the digital medium. The societies' unbounded control
over license fee structures creates a false market for blanket licenses, harms musicians and the public by
inhibiting the creation of new forms of music and music delivery possible in the digital environment.(90)
{36} Unless the foregoing concerns are addressed quickly, and immediately in accordance with a clear
domestic policy position, problems implementing and enforcing performance rights may arise on the Internet
and multiply more quickly than any feared propagation of pirated musical performances. Already, problems
are appearing as the implementation of the DPSRA begins. To date, no rate has been set for performances of
musical works "incidental" to digital phonorecord deliveries under Section 115 because it is impossible to
discern what constitutes an "incidental" performance.(91) RealAudio and other "streaming" techniques now
routinely bring music to listeners on the Internet in real-time, creating a need for clarification of the rules for
the "webcasting" industry.(92)
{37} Recently, a controversy beginning with the sale of the Diamond Rio portable mpegIII player caused a
lawsuit between the RIAA and the manufacturer of the device. The Rio case is the first calling into
controversy definitions involving a "digital audio copied recording" and a "digital audio recording device"
under the AHRA Section 1001.(93) This case shows how quickly controversy can occur when untested
digital definitional categories meet ever-evolving technology.(94) Internationally, it is not clear if the
definitions of transmission and distribution of musical works used in the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") treaties agree with the present U.S. definitions, or if the U.S. vacillation over these
definitions during the NII debate, and the subsequent loss by the U.S. of key debates at WIPO, result in a
present incongruency for musical works performance rights worldwide.(95) These, and other already-
multiplying questions, demonstrate the need for consistent policy concerning global protection of music
rights that embraces digital pathways, and sets rules appropriate to traditional copyright balances, rather than
relying on traditional rules in the absence of clear and consistent policy.
A. Bundled Rights or Collapsing Categories?
{38} Currently, it is impossible to reconcile the ASCAP argument with the Copyright Act, because it is
presently impossible to tell under Sections 101, 106, 114, and 115, the difference between sending and
receiving an online copy of a phonorecord containing a musical work, and performing the on-line work
contained in the phonorecord. Questions and inconsistencies within the rights and destinations in the present
Copyright Act make it difficult to be certain which of the following take place on the Internet:
-transmission of a musical works performance under Sections 101 and 106(4), or a musical works
reproduction embodied in a digital phonorecord delivery under Section 115;
-digital distribution of a musical work under Section 115, or transmission of a musical work performance
under Sections 101 and 106(4);
-digital delivery of a musical work copy under Sections 101 and 106(1), or digital performance of a musical
work under Sections 106(4);
-distribution of a musical work or its dissemination or broadcast by transmission;
-reproduction of a digital copy of a musical work in a digitally-delivered sound recording or digital
performance of the work under Sections 106(4) and 114.
Therefore, the categories of musical works performance and reproduction in a phonorecord on the Internet
have already collapsed. Consequently, the distribution right encompasses both musical works performances
and reproductions by transmission.
{39} Even without the passage of DPSRA, the ASCAP position would have encountered opposition, as
demonstrated by the argument in the White Paper. However, given the passage of DPSRA, the categorical
problems are even more urgently in need of clarification. Because it begins with the definitions of
"transmissions" and "performances" under the 1976 Act, ASCAP's argument fails to adequately define what
is being transmitted, or to distinguish the digital version of a musical work from the delivery system.
ASCAP's argument is weak because it assumes that copyright owners lose royalties that they are potentially
entitled to, rather than beginning with the position that it is not clear in all situations what exactly constitutes
a musical works performance on the Internet. By insisting that all transmissions are performances, and that
copyright owners are cheated out of royalties, ASCAP contends that Internet transmissions of musical works
that are not considered performances infringe upon a right that the performance societies already have, and
will lose. This slant ignores the reality that even if some transmissions of musical works are not
performances, owners of musical works stand to gain enormously overall as new markets open up through
the Internet on an unprecedented scale. ASCAP's position as a victim directs attention away from the
problems inherent in its argument, not the least of which is that copyright owners cannot be cheated out of
royalties that do not exist.
{40} Under the 1976 Act definitions, a musical work may be both fixed and reproduced in copies, or in a
recording, called a "phonorecord"(96) A phonorecord is a recorded copy of a work in the same way that sheet
music is a written copy of a work. In order to record a musical work on a phonorecord, a mechanical license
is purchased to record the work, assuming the work has already been distributed to the public on
phonorecords.(97) This means that to make and distribute a copy of a musical work in a phonorecord, a
royalty is paid to the copyright owner. Under the compulsory license provisions of Section 115, no one can be
refused such a license. Thus, Section 115 operates as a cap on how much this license costs because no one is
willing to pay more than the compulsory license rate in effect at the time of the recording. (98)
{41} However, in order to create a recorded copy of the work, the work must be performed. The version of
the recorded work is a sound recording, susceptible to its own copyright as a recorded performance of the
work. (99) Someone who wishes to purchase the recorded musical work at a traditional record store will pick
out a physical copy of the work by a particular performer, and in one physical album buy both the
phonorecord copy of the musical work and the copyrighted sound recording of the work. At this point, no
performance of either the musical work or the sound recording has taken place. The owner of the musical
work is owed a mechanical royalty for the sale of the copy of the musical work, and the owner of the sound
recording is owed a royalty for the sale of the recorded version. (100) If anyone else wants to record the
musical work, he can pay a mechanical royalty; someone who wants to copy the sound recording would
purchase a master use license from the owner of the sound recording copyright. Neither the owner of the
musical work, nor the owner of the sound recording is owed a performance royalty.
{42} Because a phonorecord is a material object, it may not be transmitted (101) under Section 101, but may
be distributed under Section 106(3). (102) However, a fixation of a musical work in a phonorecord may
simultaneously occur with a transmission of the work. (103) Even under the 1976 Act definitions, without
consideration of the DPSRA, not all transmissions of musical works are considered performances. When the
first computer transmits data from a phonorecord containing the work to another site, the fixation of the work
in the subsequent site is occurring simultaneously with the transmission. The fixation is not a performance of
the work because no work is sent aside from the phonorecord copy, resulting from the simultaneous
transmission/fixation. (104) Under Section 101, "perform" only refers to a work, not to a phonorecord.
Royalties are not due for any performance of the musical work, so the copyright owner could collect a
mechanical royalty, but not a performance royalty. This is true because only the copy of the musical work
contained in the phonorecord was sent and fixed in another phonorecord; it is not publicly performed unless
someone renders the performance of the work, in addition to completing the acts necessary to simultaneously
fix the phonorecord. (105) If the person sending the phonorecord data from her own phonorecord data does
not know that downloading to the receiving computer requires rendering a performance, it is impossible to
tell the difference between sending a copy of the work, a performance of the work, or a performance of the
sound recording. (106)
{43} To determine which copyright is implicated in a particular digitally-communicated transaction, the
problem is whether a performance can occur without delivery of a copy of the work. If delivery of the work
in a copy is essential to effectuate the transaction at its source, then the transaction is like the traditional
model of the purchase of a phonorecord in a record store. The copy embodied in the phonorecord is
purchased, whatever its recipient chooses to do with it later. Section 115 of the DPSRA, which is supposed to
clarify the situation, actually creates further confusion because it defines the delivery of a sound recording in
a "digital phonorecord delivery," (107) as possible through digital transmission, without clearly stating
whether this transmission is a new distribution right, or reproduction as a result of fixation simultaneous to
transmission. The language in the definition of "digital phonorecord delivery" clearly indicates that a
reproduction of a phonorecord containing a sound recording results from a transmission. This sounds similar
to the record store album purchase above, so long as each reproduction is specifically identifiable.
Reproduction of a sound recording is also a phonorecord containing the musical work. Therefore, the
transmission effectuating the reproduction of a musical work by fixation of necessity requires delivery of a
copy. The definition seems to mean that copies of the phonorecord are delivered via download, implicating
the mechanical reproduction right for the musical work, but the mechanical right for copies of the musical
work are not implicated when the source of the data transmission is a real-time non-interactive subscription
transmission of a sound recording, provided no reproduction is made at the inception of the transmission.
(108)
{44} If digital phonorecord delivery is a reproduction of the phonorecord, then the performance right for a
musical work contained in a phonorecord is not triggered, unless there is further rendering of the musical
work, beyond what is essential to the delivery of the copy. Section 115(c)(3)(C) provides that there is a
distinction between digital phonorecord deliveries incidental to a transmission, which constitutes delivery,
and general delivery of digital phonorecords. Both types of phonorecord reproductions are subject to a
compulsory mechanical rate, although the rate may differ. (109) Section 115(c)(3)(A) quite clearly
distinguishes downloaded reproductions from either performance of a sound recording under Section 106(6),
or performance of a musical work under Section 106(4). However, there is no indication by this distinction
that any download of a phonorecord containing a musical work must involve a performance of the underlying
work. In fact, Section 115(c)(3)(K) specifically provides that nothing in the mechanical reproduction
provisions of Section 115 annuls or limits the right to perform a musical work under Section 106(4),
including via digital transmission, nor does it annul or limit any other forms of reproduction or distribution of
a work. This distinction clearly indicates that a Section 115 digital phonorecord delivery by itself is clearly
not a performance under Section 106(4). However, Section 115(a)(1) grants a general right to distribute
copies of phonorecords containing a musical work, along with the sound recording, by means of a digital
phonorecord delivery. This right is extremely limited, and covers only those situations where delivery of a
phonorecord is a downloaded reproduction, as contemplated by Section 115(d). (110) This limitation is
extremely important; the only way phonorecords containing musical works can be distributed or delivered
under Section 115, occurs if the primary purpose of making the phonorecords is for distribution to the public
for private use. Therefore, a person making phonorecords containing musical works for any other purpose
would not be bound by Section 115, but would still be affected by Section 106(3). Considered this way, it is
easier to understand that the only practical way presently available for someone to digitally deliver
phonorecords for commercial sales is under Section 115. Sections 106(3) and the definition of "transmit,"
taken together, do not allow for digital distribution of the material phonorecords; they may only be
transmitted, simultaneously-fixed, and distributed under Section 115, which allows digital phonorecord
deliveries of Section 106(1) reproductions of phonorecords.(111)(112)
{45} Whatever was intended by the DPSRA, its inconsistencies contribute to the collapse of the categories of
performances, copies of musical works, and sound recordings contained in phonorecords. Digital
phonorecord delivery under Section 115 does not mean that a musical work contained on a phonorecord is
performed merely because data creating the phonorecord of the work is transmitted. It follows that musical
works transmitted using technology, such as streaming, which may occur without simultaneously fixing a
phonorecord of a work, could require a performance license, unless the performance is clearly private.(113)
Therefore, only performances of works designed to avoid requiring fixation of a phonorecord of a work, in
order to perform the work can be performances, if public. Otherwise, the distinctions contained in Section
115, Section 106(1), Section 106(3), and Section 106(4) collapse. (114)
B. No Present Definition or Broadcast Model Adequately Characterizes the Net
{46} ASCAP's position that all transmissions of music over the Internet are performances, and that most are
public performances, fails entirely when considered against the variety of transmission methods converging
for use in conjunction and integration with the Internet. Even if it is supportable that broadcast-like
transmissions of musical works performances over the Internet are public performances, subject to
performance royalties, there is no clear definition of "broadcast" for the Internet. Even the concept of
"broadcast" for the Internet is relatively easy to challenge. Perhaps the most obvious distinction is that, unlike
the reality of Internet delivery of a musical work, which easily requires sending a copy to the recipient
computer, analog broadcast does not require delivery of a copy of a work in order for the listener to receive
and to hear the broadcast. (115) For this reason, it has been historically easy to distinguish between a
broadcast performance and the delivery of a copy of a work, whether or not a user with the correct equipment
chooses to independently create a copy of the work, or re-transmit the work.(116) Unless all transmissions of
musical works performances over the Internet can occur without sending a simultaneous fixation of a copy, it
is impossible to make the analytical leap that ASCAP makes because transmissions of musical works
performances can occur, that in fact such a performance always does occur, even if such transmissions come
within the broad definition of brodcast in the 1976 Act. The electronic particles ASCAP contends are
identical to the data stream sent over a computer network, and are not analogous, simply because a radio or
television station's particles do not, by themselves, stick to a receiving radio or T.V.
{47} It follows that only sending streaming audio or similar performances could possibly be considered
performing of musical works within the broadcast transmission model; (117) but even streamed feeds of
musical works defy traditional broadcast model analysis. Real-time audio is inherently more likely to be
interactive than traditional analog radio broadcasts. (118) This is the reason that the DPSRA explicitly
recognizes differing levels of interactivity involved in transmission of musical performances over the
Internet. In its initial form, the DPSRA mandated performances to be licensed at the highest rate, if there is a
greater risk of copying, as a result of the control exercised by the interactive user, who would be able to plan
the receipt of the performance. It completely exempted performances perceived to be less likely copied.(119)
Deliveries considered the most similar to broadcast were completely exempted from licensing fees, and did
not require permission from the sound recording copyright owner for performance. In other words, in spite of
the potential for problems resulting from lack of clarity over what constitutes sending a performance, the
DPSRA assumed a broadcast model for delivering performances. However, even given this assumption, the
DPSRA incorporation of varying levels to protect works demonstrates differences involving the Internet
medium for delivery of performed works, even in the respects closest to traditional broadcast. This
inconsistency shows how inadequate the existing, geographically-oriented performance rules are; otherwise,
the DPSRA would not attempt to set and incorporate a newly-tiered approach for protection.
{48} The DPSRA has already been amended, primarily because of the rapid rise of "webcasting" on the
Internet. As part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), and with little debate, discussion,
notice, or fanfare, Congress, persuaded by the RIAA,(120) changed the DPSRA to include new statutory
licenses for previously-exempted performances. (121) In this amendment, Congress accepted the RIAA's
flawed argument that exempted broadcast-like performances, less amenable to copying, were not free after
all. RIAA persuaded the webcasters that a new statutory license would free them from the threat of a
copyright owner's refusal to allow a webcaster to play a sound recording. Part of the reason this change
occurred is because webcasting, a theory when the DPSRA was passed in 1995, became a threatening
industry by the 1998 amendment, less than three years later. (122) Such arbitrary change in a complex and
potentially lucrative right illustrates the inadequacy of the existing broadcast performance and traditional
broadcast model rules for the Internet.
{49} Even if the broadcast model were appropriate for some webcasting deliveries, it does not determine
whether a public performance of a musical work takes place because digital transmission of music over the
Internet does not always fit the established rules based upon geographically-located venues, performers,
performances, and broadcast or distribution systems.(123) This means that an assessment of whether a given
musical works performance is public, either because it occurs before a live audience, a transmission of the
live performance is sent to the public, or fixation of a performance is sent to the public, is not easily answered
under the existing liability rules for live or transmitted performances.
{50} ASCAP equates the ease with which musical works transmissions are accessible over the Internet to the
public with the terminology - "reaches" the public. (124) Thus, all transmissions are public performances
under the Copyright Act. ASCAP must address the issue of what is "public" on the Internet prior to
addressing public performance of musical works. Because an Internet user may intentionally or
unintentionally "capture" and hear, or otherwise hear a performance of a musical work transmitted on the
Internet, does not mean that every transmission of a performance is a public act per se. The Internet does not
automatically become public, just because a House Report says that the transmission of any performance is
public if the transmission reaches the public in any form. It is not at all clear what is considered "public" on
the Internet. The rationale behind the holding that a performance is considered "public" if transmitted to the
public, even if no one receives the performance, assumes an analog broadcast model of musical works
performance that is not viable for the Internet. Even if some of these transmissions are public performances,
the ASCAP argument fails to mention, much less correctly analyze, the Section 110 exemptions that would
exempt otherwise infringing broadcasts or performances. (125)
{51} For example, even if a website is regarded as "public" because information available through the site
can be accessed at any time by Internet users, this does not mean that the performance of a musical work
accessible at the site is always deemed "public". If the recipient has a copy of the work delivered to his
computer in order to listen to the work, then that particular performance, even if replayed by the individual
recipient, would be considered private. If the musical work were delivered to an individual user by streaming,
or any technique not requiring the simultaneous delivery of a copy, the performance would be private if the
individual user requested the performance to be streamed to his computer privately. Either type of transaction
could be an actual or analogue of the private e-mail transaction, attaching a copy of a phonorecord, or a
privately-controlled streaming of a song. ASCAP acknowledges that this kind of communication is private,
and not to be considered a public performance. (126)
{52} Of course, given that ASCAP claims transmissions are public at any point where a transmission may
theoretically be picked up by the public, the notion that e-mail could contain a private performance is
inconsistent. This is illustrative of the problem which occurs by applying dated notions of what is "public",
for copyright purposes on the Internet. Apart from the Internet, dispute exists over what law governs a
transmission of a public performance, because present law is set up around a dissolving model, based upon
purely geographical considerations. (127) Even if the view that website postings of music are "public" is
accepted, (128) because the delivery of transmissions of protected musical works on the Internet does not fit
any established geographical or physical models, it is not immediately obvious which public postings of
music are also going to be deemed public performances of works. The problem is that transmissions of
musical works performances over the Internet are analogous to several delivery systems for music, so that no
single model suffices to identify the performer or broadcaster, who is the recipient, whether it is public or
private, and the venue. ASCAP's misplaced insistence that old analog broadcast model rules answer these
questions in the Internet of 1999, much less the Internet of 2010, either ignores, or is exceptionally ignorant
of technological reality.
{53} Further, some of the Section 110 exemptions may apply to the Internet, making it even less clear how
the traditional broadcast-model categories work in a new context. For example, Section 110(5), exempting
communication of a performance via a "public reception of the transmission on a single[-]receiving apparatus
of a kind commonly used in private homes," may apply to everything from family home computers, receiving
streamed music, to small establishments, receiving streamed radio or "celestial jukebox" feeds. (129) In these
instances, depending upon the exact technology used to deliver the musical work, it is not clear who would be
required to pay a performance royalty. It appears that Section 110(5) exempts at least the recipient/further
transmitter of the work who fits the statutory criteria. (130) However, the Section 110(5) criteria are
notoriously difficult to apply, even in traditional settings, so it is reasonable to expect that it will take some
analysis before it is clear how the criteria apply to the Internet.(131) ASCAP's complete failure to consider
the exemption in the Internet context is therefore all the more inexplicable and indefensible. Finally, with the
recent passage of the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998," (132) it is apparent that the current trend in
Congress is to expand the number of music users exempted under Section 110(5), rather than to limit the
provision's application.
{54} All of these technical arguments aside, it is apparent under Reno v. ACLU, (133) that ASCAP's
insistence upon the old analog broadcast model to assess musical works performance issues is an untenable
position because the Supreme Court sees the Internet as "a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide
communication."(134) Although the issue in Reno directly concerns the constitutionality of the
Communications Decency Act ["CDA"] portion of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, (135) the Court
considered how the Internet and Internet interaction could best be characterized to determine which
regulatory mechanism applies to the Internet. After concluding that the Internet is actually a synthesis of a
variety of communication and information retrieval methods, which are constantly evolving and impossible
to categorize, the Court went on to specifically distinguish the Internet from traditional broadcast industry
models:
Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic fora of the Internet
been subject to the type of government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast
industry. Moreover, the Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio or television. The District Court
specifically found that communications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's home or
appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content by accident. (136)
By making such a clear distinction between broadcasting and the Internet as a whole, the Court entertained
the possibility that entirely new forms of communication, and composite and hybrid forms of communication
and information exchange, will evolve on the Internet. However, the Court suggested that in its present form,
the Internet more closely resembles a telephone network, rather than an analog broadcast network. Using the
Internet, the Court determined, is like placing a telephone call. Web addresses are more like telephone
numbers than broadcast stations, because they require the user to take a more clearly affirmative step to
access information, than that required to tune a dial on a radio. (137)(138) The fact that the Court has already
made this distinction, eviscerates ASCAP's entire argument.
{55} ASCAP, however, might argue that, if the Internet is more like a telephone system, its argument remains
intact; because musical works delivery would be analogous to "music on hold," which involves public
performance of the work. Music on hold can be delivered in several ways, including a live radio feed run
through the telephone line, or a canned music recording played through the telephone line. However, even if
music on hold is a public performance, (139) there are obvious problems applying the concept to Internet
connections. Music on hold does not require a copy in the receiver in order for a performance to be received.
Perhaps even more importantly, the model of a telephone network cannot entirely describe the Internet,
although it may be analogous to some forms of Internet communication, or some features of the Internet, like
addresses. The Court's analogy simply means that some features of the Internet resemble telephone
communications; yet, even if a telephone network is an appropriate model for some Internet transactions,
defining the network, as distinguished from other communication networks, is still not easy.
{56} In fact, part of the problem applying musical works performance rules to the Internet stems from the
collapse of traditional categories distinguishing types of broadcasts from telephone, cable, satellite, wireless,
and computing networks. Today, many combinations of broadcast and communications technology are
available, which may be subject to different copyright rules, depending on how they are defined. (140)
Historical distinctions based upon analog broadcast models are no longer feasible because conceptual and
definitional confusion resulting from the "technological convergence" (141) of works creation and delivery
systems disrupts previously-separable copyright categories and policy balances. Categories of transmissions
previously separated under the Copyright Act, for example, cable under Section 111, and satellite under
Section 119, are each subject to different licensing rules. (142) When these systems are fed through, or
otherwise combined with the Internet, they appear to collapse under the broad definition of "transmit." (143)
Most importantly, because some transmissions combine technologies presently regulated by different laws,
which, are in turn, governed by massively divergent policy balances, it is unclear which definitions and
regulations will apply between the Copyright Act, communications regulation, and information law.
{57} In an August 1998 Working Paper, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") acknowledged
the impending collision of definitional categories for the Internet's expanding integrated transmission
technologies, by warning that: "Internet service offerings, such as those provided over the Internet, present
fundamental problems to a regulatory framework dependent upon technological distinctions. As one writer
recently observed, '[w]hen basic and enhanced services become intertwined and indistinguishable, the current
regulatory system implodes.'" (144) The implosion results, in part, from the impossibility of applying any
single existing regulatory framework or model to the entire Internet. (145) If the FCC, as the entity in charge
of regulating the broadcast industry, admits that it cannot use existing categories to define the Internet,
ASCAP cannot claim to be certain that transmissions of musical works are broadcast-like performances.
Under the Copyright Act, exemptions from and compromises over liability for the performance right are
based upon concerns arising from technological threats of easy copying, problems of enforcement, and
problems of categorization. The DPSRA encompasses all of the concerns with its striation of liability levels,
discriminating between situations with little perceived danger of copying (exempt from liability), to situations
involving a high risk of copying (higher cost, copyright owner retains right to refuse to license). Similarly, the
cable compulsory license takes into account the danger of copying by subscribers, balanced against the
impossibility of requiring cable broadcasters to negotiate individually with copyright owners over individual
programs. (146)
{58} Problems occur where the policy interests collide. (147) For example, if the Internet is analogous to a
cable system, does this mean that the FCC must regulate it? Will many copyright questions become moot
because everyone will apply for compulsory licenses under Section 111? (148) Obviously, ASCAP's position
is untenable, either technically, under the Copyright Act jurisprudence, or as a matter of policy and common
sense. ASCAP simply cannot claim universal performance rights royalties by relying upon its outmoded and
outdated arguments based upon yesterday's broadcast realities. Even the recently-passed webcasting
amendment to the DMCA shows the reality of "webcast" is already beyond the ASCAP argument because,
among other reasons, the new amendment discriminates between terrestrial broadcast stations licensed by the
FCC, and satellite digital audio, and distinguishes fees and types of licenses between these phenomena. (149)
The Conference Report explaining the policy behind the amendment specifically acknowledges and
distinguishes "streaming" technology that can be sent without copying by the user. (150) Clearly, these
distinctions, and the recognition that not all transmissions are broadcast-like, makes a challenge necessary to
the performing rights societies' position.
C. Not All Musical Works on the Internet Are Alike
{59} ASCAP's argument ignores the reality that digital musical works are not all alike. Even assuming a
digital delivery system for musical works performances, not all formats for the works could fit into the old
serial model rules. Music may be stored in order, such as on a fixed CD, so that digital information is relayed,
translated, and performed by the device "playing" the music file from beginning to end. For example, if a
music user uploads a CD sound recording into her computer and plays it back, she is playing a fixed file of
music data, in the same way a traditional CD player would. In either example, the musical work is stored on
the CD, and the file is delivered in order, so that a digital fixation of the sounds of the musical work is
performed. It is conceivable that this kind of data file is a phonorecord of a musical work within the existing
Copyright Act definitions because it is very similar to any other analog fixation of the sounds of a work being
performed. However, once a user changes this file, by uploading it, altering it, or interacting with it, whether
the file is still a fixation of the musical work that can be recognizably performed, and thus, infringe upon a
performance right, as opposed to infringing only upon a reproduction right, depends upon the alterations.
{60} Musical Instrument Digital Interface ("MIDI") files challenge the existing definitions of musical works,
phonorecords, and soundrecordings because by their nature, they are designed to facilitate, cause, create, or
encourage manipulation of musical material. (151) It is a multifaceted set of products enabling users to create
music, either on electronic or electronically-connected instruments, by writing music via a method
comparable to using a word processor, or even by listening. (152) MIDI storage of musical works differs
radically from traditional music storage in traditional phonorecords in most respects. In fact, the only
common feature between the two forms of storage is that a musical work can be stored as audio alone, for use
as a recording of the work for playback. However, MIDI was never intended to be a new form of
phonorecord. MIDI music files differ from traditional audio files because they do not include all of the data
constituting a musical work, and do not have to contain actual stored sounds of a work's recording. Instead,
the MIDI file contains a set of instructions to tell the other components of the MIDI system, or another MIDI
system, to execute steps that will create sounds. Because less data is necessary, MIDI files are much smaller
than traditional audio files. Given its communicator role, (153) the MIDI file, in combination with a
sequencer, (154) functions almost like an orchestra conductor; it communicates with the rest of the computer
system's components to create a particular version of a work by directing the computer to perform steps
creating individual musical steps, which constitute the performance. Even though a MIDI file can be fixed
and the user may choose to play it without alteration, the MIDI system never plays back captured sounds; it
repeatedly creates the work.
{61} Therefore, just as an orchestra performs a work, so does a MIDI system, and if a fixed audio MIDI file
is publicly performed, there is no barrier to the collection of performance royalties for the resulting
performance of the musical works. But when MIDI files are downloaded or uploaded, a performance does not
necessarily occur. First, because the file containing the list of events to be executed is reproduced in a
simultaneous fixation, as argued in Parts II and III, the transmission is not a public performance, although it
can be considered as such, if streaming or a comparable type of delivery is used.
{62} Second, because MIDI files are designed for flexibility, and invite manipulation by the user, it is not
clear what category best describes the files for copyright purposes. The Copyright Office considers an audio
MIDI file to be a sound recording, finding it analogous to a piano roll or a CD, and the storage media to be a
phonorecord. (155) This means that audio MIDI files containing music qualify for a compulsory license
under Section 115, and the royalty rate is fundamentally capped by the current statutory maximum. The
problem is, however, that most MIDI applications are designed for interactivity, so that even if audio alone is
an option, the nature of MIDI invites a user to combine audio with graphics, other sounds, and other audio.
(156) One very easy way to avoid any potential application of the Section 115 compulsory license is to
combine MIDI audio with MIDI visual, rendering Section 115 inapplicable, and requiring a negotiated
license. (157) Because any MIDI file may be easily manipulated, many files will contain visual elements;
these files, even if publicly-performed, cannot be licensed by ASCAP because they are audiovisual works.
(158) Third, because MIDI files contain instructions, rather than data representing captured sound or ordered,
notated music, MIDI files may be best categorized as computer software, rather than traditional music media.
(159)
{63} However, the instructions are dictated at least, in part, by the nature of the musical work, making the
MIDI file a reproduction of the musical work which may be replicated exactly or altered. The computer
instruction set containing the potential musical work is similar to the instructions for video game strategy
levels protected as reproductions in Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc.(160) Unlike a traditional sound recording of
a musical work, the work embodied in the MIDI instruction set is inseparable from the computer program,
while it remains in MIDI format. (161)
{64} Because MIDI can make anyone who can operate a device similar to a word processor a composer, it is
popular; (162) in fact, it has become a musical culture. MIDI helped create access to music and musical
performance practice that was unavailable to people who could play traditional instruments, but who liked
electronic sounds, as well as to those who could not play traditional instruments well enough to execute the
sounds they would like to hear. MIDI created the means by which new techniques developed. One writer
calls MIDI the "democratization" of music, allowing active musical access for all. (163) MIDI can function
with many MIDI instruments plugged in, so interactivity exists not only at the level of preexisting music
instruction files, but also amongst the musicians performing together, and/or along with the computer. Given
the interactive nature of MIDI composing and performing, the lines between composer and performer are
now blurred, and this blurred relationship demonstrates that music notation is not a necessary prerequisite
feature of a recorded, fixed musical work. (164)
{65} ASCAP's argument leaves no room for the reality that some MIDI files that are uploaded, downloaded,
or otherwise transmitted on the Internet are unique and require unique treatment. This is why, in the music
industry reality, MIDI files are licensed in individual ways, based upon rights encompassed by the use of
files, and not by artificial assumptions about categories of containers. The Harry Fox Agency licenses MIDI
audio files by limiting the scope of the license to audio only, and by acknowledging in the license that the
category is experimental. (165) Other versions identify the license as a MIDI rights license, refusing to limit
the scope of the license and price to the Section 115 statutory rate. (166) Surely, if the music industry
recognizes that MIDI is a format well beyond the traditional modes of recording, ASCAP cannot assume that
all transmissions of musical works in MIDI files over the Internet are public performances of the work, nor
that the performance rights societies should be the entities collecting such royalties.
D. Musical Works Performance Rights on the Internet Must be Balanced by Public Access
{66} Congress made it undeniably clear that the broadly-granted Section 106(4) performance right under the
1976 Act is limited by Sections 107-120, and any other traditional copyright limitations, like fair use and de
minimus use of the musical work. (167) Congress' concern for maintaining the constitutionally-mandated
balance providing public access to musical works performances is quite clear, because it balanced the
performance right with specific exemptions in Section 110. (168) ASCAP makes no mention of the traditional
limitations on the performance right, or on any copyright monopoly, nor does it address any other theory that
balances its hold on performance rights in musical works, that may be exercised on the Internet. In making
this glaring omission, ASCAP essentially asserts an unconstitutional position, fails to counter any of these
limitations, and further weakens its credibility.
{67} Briefly summarized in this section are a few of the many arguments and theories that mandate or
suggest limits on the copyright owner's exercise of performance rights in musical works on the Internet.
These and other arguments must be considered before the ASCAP position is to be accepted, in addition to
the arguments already addressed. To do otherwise grants a performance rights society enormous power
without accounting for the public benefit of public access to musical works in the U.S. and abroad.
1. How does Section 110 exempt some performances of musical works?
{68} In addition to the Section 110(5) exemption discussed earlier, Section 110(1) may apply by analogy
because some classrooms are virtual, and face-to-face teaching situations need interpretation in the of context
of distance learning. (169) Even though Section 110(2) seems to apply most easily in the Internet context, it
covers performance of a work in the course of "systematic instructional activities." It would be a mistake to
apply only Section 110(2). Both exemptions are needed to encompass all of the educational uses of
interactive materials over the Internet, most notably, including collaborative educational-based efforts, and
necessary pupil-to-pupil, or teacher-to-pupil, transmissions not directly in a classroom, but work necessary
for a class. Musicians may need to work on music together, or send it to performers who will participate in its
performance. (170) Sections 110(3), (4), (6)-(10) need interpretation because there are already virtual
locations, like churches, and other virtual educational settings on the Internet. (171)
{69} There appears to be no reason why these exemptions cannot apply. Section 110(7), in particular needs
interpretation because there is no clear definition of what constitutes a vending establishment with the sole
purpose of performing musical works to promote retail sale of works or sound recordings containing the
works on the Internet. There are already many locations selling online music and recordings, but the freedom
the exemption may allow to an online vendor in rendering the work part of its place of business online is
unclear. (172) The scope of the types of establishments that can claim this exemption are equally unclear,
which seems broadly enough as written, to encompass a wide variety of sites.
2. What is the scope of permissible non-infringing public access to musical works performed on the Internet?
{70} In Reno v. ACLU, (173) the Court hints that the Internet is a public forum, by expressing its concern that
the government stay out of regulation censoring its content. Ironically, it is both concern for public access to
speech in the form of music, and concern for music users' privacy rights that implies that First Amendment
rights are not served by any collective, like ASCAP, gaining to much control over defining the proper balance
between music owners' rights to compensation under the copyright monopoly, and music users' rights to
access and use music without being monitored.
{71} If all transmissions of music are public performances requiring payment for use, then music users
cannot make an informed choice whether they want to use music by listening to it. Similarly, a music user
cannot browse, nor listen to a performance for the purpose of creating a parody under the fair use provisions
in Section 107. (174) Additionally, the proposed "pay-per-listen" models are flawed because no provision
exists for fair use. (175) Restrictions like this, in combination with the coercive tactics used by the
performance rights societies, effectively determine who has access to performances of musical works by price
scale, rather than by fair administration of performance rights in accordance with copyright law in its
constitutional balance.
{72} Of course, the societies' interest in expanding their control to encompass as much of the Internet as
possible is understandable; but the power to influence access to music must be curtailed at the boundaries of
fair and de minimus use. If the current performance licensing scheme is retained for the Internet, prices
should be based upon a discernable rationale, and consent decree provisions must be enforced. Otherwise, the
societies will be able to extract blanket Internet music licenses from everyone, because when a collective
license is available, fair use is non-existent, or at least, much less likely to be recognized.(176)
3. Under what circumstances is private copying of musical works performance permissible?
{73} In addition to traditional copyright exemptions for fair uses in general, downloading music, including
copying any performance feed, is permissible when the use is clearly private and only the user's personal
copy is retained. Under the AHRA, (177) home copying of digital music is permitted for noncommercial
uses. (178) While the use contemplated under the AHRA is an exemption for non-commercial copying of
reproductions of musical recordings, there is no barrier to applying the AHRA to consumer-copied
performances, such as streamed performances that are subject to performance licensing on the Internet.
Performances may be exempted because the language of the exemption allows a consumer to make "digital
musical recordings" that are broadly-defined as material objects in which sounds are fixed.(179) This
provision means that a consumer may use a recording device to capture a streamed performance for private
use. The performance does not have to be copied directly from a reproduction in order to qualify for this
exemption. (180) Finally, music performances that are available through a website may be subject to an
implied license, permitting the user to listen to the performance. (181) The rationale is that a website
operator's purpose is to make the work available to the public, at least in the absence of restrictions to entry
into the site. Intensive browsing, and even browsing requiring temporary copying into the user's computer, is
allowable under this theory. (182) 
  
  
IV. Digital Rights in Musical Works: A Realistic Approach to Resolving the Legal,
Technological, and Musical Reality of the Internet
{74} No matter whether a musical work is performed, reproduced, displayed, or distributed on the Internet,
the owner of the work may be owed a royalty. When a compensable use of the work occurs, it should not
matter what category it fits, or who collects the royalty, but only that the owner's economic interest in the
Internet use is protected, balanced with the public benefit in works being made available on the Internet.
ASCAP's best argument is that, as long as the artificial categories of rights, tortured as these classifications
may become, are kept intact and the status quo remains in force, it is easier to ensure that the music owner
gets paid for some Internet music use, ensuring predictability in the forecast for royalties; but the reality is
that, by failing to fully embrace the Internet's unique and purposely unclassifiable essence, and insisting upon
its argument based upon categories and models that no longer make sense, ASCAP costs music owners
royalty revenue, and delays the development of music usage models that are practical. Because the Internet is
truly unique, new licensing models are appropriate, and concomitant licensing fees, unbound by old rules and
consent decrees would develop.
{75} If ASCAP and BMI were not bound by consent decrees, and could, for example, license music for use
beyond their present constraints, one wonders whether they would be so quick to define a market for Internet
music performance, without taking into account the potential for greater revenues from interactive music use
licenses, and other potential digital music use licenses. It appears that one solution to the problems addressed
in the NII and performance societies' arguments is to allow digital works to be used as flexibly as the Internet
and similar interactive mediums will allow. By stressing the behavior and interactive nature of the work in the
digital environment, rather than rigid adherence to illusory historical models, there is a basis for assessing
appropriate licensing fees based upon the market, balanced by a body of Internet and digital fair use
principles. This idea is already suggested in part by the American Bar Association in its proposal to amend
Section 101 to add a definition of "Digital Work." (183) Although the ABA definition is limited to literary
works, its key idea of grading a work's flexibility by its "behavioral capability" is worthy of consideration
beyond its originally suggested scope. (184) Using this concept, whether a musical work is considered to be
"performed" is measured by the acts and behavior of the work in its digitally-induced communicative
process, rather than by simply lumping transmissions into one characterization, as is necessary to find present
Internet musical works performances. (185)
{76} Of course, there remains a need to track the uses of a musical work, even under a model that allows for
interactive digital uses. Further, traditional licensing concerns like how and where the work is used can best
be accommodated if a licensing regime is easily administrable. However, there is no reason that the
administering entity has to be any of the existing performance rights societies, because the technology that
allows the performance rights societies to monitor music uses on the Internet could be used by anyone who
chooses to compete with the licensing entities. Even copyright owners can more easily license and administer
their works, at least in the sense that the process is easy for protecting uses of the works, via several
technological methods. (186) More collectives would be healthier for competition, and would force reality
into the Internet music licensing pricing strategy. Further, because new collectives would not operate under
the consent decrees, it would be easier to ascertain and to implement global music licensing market prices.
Similarly, new licenses, even for music performance, could more easily develop in a freely-competitive
market.
{77} A "digiworks" or "digital works" approach appears to offer copyright owners greater options and
opportunities for the Internet, as the concept continues to evolve. Needless to say, these approaches greatly
threaten ASCAP and BMI, who exist entirely because they are the lesser evils for copyright owners who
cannot otherwise enforce their performance rights; but both ASCAP and BMI deliver a disservice to
copyright owners by advocating a position that actually limits potential music royalty revenue, and serves
only to keep revenue in the control of the societies, by promotion of a perceived loss of revenue to music
owners. It does not make sense that the copyright owner will receive royalties from uses of the work,
whatever the source, and whatever the use is called. Because interactive "digiworks" music licenses can be
freely negotiated, no loss of revenue from Internet use of the work has to occur at all. (187) Such a flexible
licensing approach would also resolve the problem of geographic origination of a musical works use. Instead,
the focus would be on the work's availability for digital interactive uses, and the responsibility for the
transaction would be on the person or entity having the most control over the transaction. (188) Liability rules
could be based upon the cost of liability for unauthorized uses, rather than solely on the basis of (189) This
approach avoids the subjectivity of the NII's primary purpose test, while preserving its recognition that more
than one kind of digitally-transmitted transaction exists.
{78} Because the Internet is a Web of connected communication technologies that is evolving more quickly
than any single historical communications model, (190) it makes sense to structure rules for the Internet that
embrace its flexibility and uniqueness, rather than impede its progress. No matter what ASCAP or any other
group argues, there is no way to entirely prevent copying on the Internet, if a work is posted or streamed
without security. (191) However, given that the music industry recognizes that its technology must keep pace
with the opportunities to exploit musical works on the Internet, it makes sense that legal protection regimes
must allow for the flexibility of exploitation. Achieving new recording and protection standards, while
allowing flexible use of music is more realistic and lucrative than adhering to outmoded rules and
interpretations. (192) The music industry is poised to move forward, while ASCAP promotes its position,
akin to a kitten advocating the forever chasing of its technological tail, with no hope of ever catching it. 
  
  
V. Conclusion
{79} Musical works performance rights for the Internet must be considered a part of digital musical works
usage in flexible settings and applications. ASCAP's argument, instead of protecting music owners, actually
harms them by standing in the way of enlightened development of musical works rights that serve copyright
owners and facilitate public access to musical works through the Internet's public fora. Rights without reality
engenders further fighting, and loss of energy and money to enliven the already-dying concepts. There is
simply no reason to accept the ASCAP position that all transmissions of musical works on the Internet are
public performances. Such a position only serves to enliven potentially-dying performance rights societies
and does nothing to fully exploit the potential music markets for the Internet.
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distributions of copies or reproductions, defining "copies" as material objects other than phonorecords, and
allowing distribution of copies or phonorecords. See also David Goldberg and Robert J. Bernstein, The
Information Infrastructure, 212 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1994 at 3.
[56].  See id.
[57].  See id.; GREEN PAPER, supra note 48, at 122.
[58].  See WHITE PAPER, supra note 48 at 218, n. 544 (continuing to urge the primary purpose test cloaked as
explanation in a footnote). See also Information Law Alert: A Vorhees Report, Let the Jockeying Begin:
Copyright Gang Begins to Gang Up On One Another in Battle for the Future, (No. 17, Vol.2, October 28,
1994) (Thompson); Josh Warner, Negotiating Licenses and Royalties in Multimedia is Still an Evolving
Process, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 18, 1994, at S12.
[59].  See Les Watkins, The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Delicate
Negotiations, Inadequate Protection, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 323, 333 (1996)(interpreting the new
Section 115 as granting a new digital distribution right in musical works contained in "digital phonorecord
deliveries" subject to a mechanical royalty). See also Frank Music v. Compuserve, No. 93 Civ. 8153
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 19, 1993) (settled almost contemporaneously with the passage of DPSRA, and without
litigating the issue of whether musical works uploaded and downloaded on the Internet, as MIDI files, are
subject to mechanical licensing).
[60].  For example, the DPSRA contemplates broadcast-like performances of sound recordings, that if subject
to existing broadcast-model rules would often be subject to performance royalties.
[61].  See 17 U.S.C. Sections 114(B)(i),(C), 115(c)(3)(A)(K), 115(d). See also ASCAP Comments, supra at
note 49, at 5: 
 
Simply put, the potential of the NII for replacement of record sales by digital electronic
transmissions is too    great a threat to performers and record producers --  to say nothing of
writers and publishers of music -- to be ignored.  But such rights can not be granted to the
detriment of existing rights. That is, new rights cannot in any way derogate the rights of creators
and copyright owners of the musical compositions which are recorded.
See also David Goldberg and Robert J. Bernstein, The Information Infrastructure, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1994, at
3 (discussing generally Green Paper and performance societies' arguments, including the primary purpose
test, and illustrating how timing of the sound recording performance right debate colored the debate as to the
best way to categorize transmissions of rights on the Internet).
[62].  ASCAP Comments, supra note 49 at 4.
[63].  See id.
[64].  See id at 7-11. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 63,64 (1976)(Reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5677) [hereinafter House Report]. In response to the technological advancement problems then posed by
radio and television analog broadcast, the 1976 Act attempts to define perform to include any conceivable
method of rendering a musical work audible as a performance, with and without the aid of any device or
process, and under any concept of transmission from one location to another, including indirect processes.
[65].  See ASCAP Comments, supra note 49, at 12.
[66].  See id. at 12.
[67].  There is a long line of interesting cases establishing the parameters of performers, performances, and
venues, but a discussion of these would be outside the scope of this article. See ASCAP Comments, supra
note 49, at 10, 13-17; See 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 68-73 (discussing broadcast transmission of musical
works performances and related cases, and arguing that the Internet and similar computer network
environments fit into the parameters established in these cases). See also sources cited supra note 17. ASCAP
also uses Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) to support its argument because
Frena held that pictures could be displayed by transmission over a computer network, and the 1976 Act
definitions would mandate the same result for musical works performance by computer network transmission.
[68].  ASCAP Comments, supra note 49, at 13 (citing "the specific technology used --  whether by telephone
wires, coaxial cables, or satellite carriers --  is immaterial").
[69].  See id. at 14.
[70].  See id. at 8, 12 (outlining the various steps involved in transmitting a musical work performance over
the Internet, including the storage of the work by a transmitting service, and acknowledging, without
distinguishing, that transmissions can take place in 'real' or 'compressed' time).
[71].  See id. at 12-17 (citing House Report supra note 64, at 63) (concept of public performance covers not
only the initial showing, but any act by which that performance is further transmitted or communicated to the
public; for example a cable system is performing when it retransmits a broadcast to its subscribers, and an
individual is performing when she plays a recording or turns on a receiving set); See also id., supra note 64,
at 64 ("Each and every method by which the images or sounds comprising a performance or display are
picked up is a 'transmission,' and if the transmission reaches the public in any form, the case comes within the
scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106."); and, id. (citing David v. Showtime Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F.
Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1988))(Showtime's transmissions of copyrighted music to local cable systems for
retransmission, instead of broadcasting directly itself to viewing public, were still public performances;
rejecting the argument that Showtime was a "passive carrier" thus exempt from copyright liability, because of
its selection and control of the transmissions). See also 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 70-71 (there would be
no need for the Section 111 cable retransmission copyright liability exemption, if such retransmissions were
not public performances).
[72].  See, ASCAP Comments, supra note 49, at 17.
[73].  See id. at 4.
[74].  See id. at 21-23.
[75].  See id. at 22-23. See also Warner, supra note 58, at S12 (quoting Don Passman, noted music business
attorney and author, as raising still unclear questions as to whether the download of new album would be
public performance broadcast, like analog radio, or sale of pre-recorded music, like CD, noting differences in
the licensing involved).
[76].  See Reply Comments of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers on the
Preliminary Draft of the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property, (filed October 20, 1994),
cited in 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 72-73.
[77].  See 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 70. This point is defended and supported by the Kohns' argument that
any other interpretation is wrong because all a sender would have to do to avoid performance right liability
would be to send files that are not audible simultaneously with the transmission.
[78].  While liability of online service providers themselves is not yet clear, blanket licensing of music
performance rights solves any potential infringement problems the services may encounter. See Protection of
Copyrights in Music for the 90's and Beyond, Course No. 7725R, Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education
Committee & the Entertainment, Arts & Sports Law Section, (Feb. 29, 1996) remarks and presentation by
Bennett M. Lincoff [hereinafter "Lincoff remarks"].
[79].  There remain some issues over who is the infringer in various contexts involving the uploading,
downloading, and otherwise sending protected material over the Internet. The recently passed "Digital
Millennium Copyright Act" answers some of the questions regarding internet service provider liability for
such material if it infringes. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) [hereinafter "DCMA"].
[80].  See Lincoff remarks, supra note 78.
[81].  See ASCAP Experimental Performance License Agreement for ComputerOnline Services, Electronic
Bulletin Boards, Internet Sites, and Similar Operations [hereinafter "ASCAP Internet License"] (license
option "A" fee structure derived from gross revenue of the site itself, not including revenue from any goods
sold online).
[82].  See Lincoff remarks, supra note 78 (stating while some trade and other users groups for the Internet
were identifiable, it was difficult to ascertain what would be the appropriate industry group for the purpose of
negotiating fair rates the way ASCAP does with traditional licenses).
[83].  See Internet license sites, supra note 51.
[84].  ASCAP Internet Licensing (visited July 11, 1999) <http://www.ascap.com/weblicense/webfaq.html>.
[85].  Id.  See also Hillman, supra note 33 (arguing that these types of statements are coercive and in fact
violate the ASCAP consent decrees).
[86].  Fees still based on website revenue; new tracking requirements and absence of separate license for
nonprofit sites.
[87].  See New ASCAP Licenses Drafted With Web in Mind, MEDIA DAILY  (No. 5, Vol. 4, Dec. 12, 1997).
[88].  See id.
[89].  For another example, the current SESAC license for Internet web sites, that does not also apply to
Online Computer Services, requires a minimum $50.00/six mos. fee. See Internet licenses, supra note 51.
[90].  See Hillman, supra note 33, at 734 (specifically identifying internet music market as a place where
legislation is needed immediately to curb unchecked market power of performance rights societies). See also
Jane C. Ginsberg, Putting Cars On the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in
Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1489-90 (1995)(advocating a collective licensing model generally for
Internet copyright licensing, and particularly musical works performance rights model for digital enforcement
problems). Collective licensing may spread to protected works other than music, and so may the increased
use of primarily blanket licensing models as a perceived easy and already worked out way to administer
rights on the Internet. This is a problem if the problems inherent in the musical works performance model are
not addressed and corrected before the idea spreads.
[91].  See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 64 Fed. Reg. 6221-23
(1999)(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. Part 255)(establishing rates for some digital phonorecord deliveries under
Section 115 and delaying setting rates for "incidental" deliveries).
[92].  See infra Part III.A. and B. Again, what occurs under the music copyright rules is likely to affect other
protected works. For example, distance learning can use real-time streaming to bring the live professor to the
user.
[93].  See 17 U.S.C. Section 1001.
[94].  See infra, note 122. See also (visited July 11,1999) <http://www.MP3.com> and related links for the
story of the Rio litigation. MpegIII is a data compression technique that allows fast downloads of audio
and/or video data. MP3 sites presently proliferate on the Internet, causing concern and hysteria about piracy.
See Recording Industry Association of America website (visited July 11,1999) <http://www.riaa.com>;
<http://www.kohnmusic.com> (Bob Kohn involved in this litigation in support of Rio). See also John C.
Dvorak, MP3 Spells Disaster, PC MAGAZINE , March 9, 1999; MP3 and the Record Industry-Musician's
Exchange, (vistited July 11, 1999) <http://musicians.miningco.com/library/weekly/aa122198.htm>.
[95].  See generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997);
Stephen Fraser, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules and Roadblocks on the Global
Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 759 (1997).
[96].  Section 101 provides:
A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord...is         sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation
of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.; 'Phonorecords' are material
objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual
work,are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device. The term 'phonorecords' includes the material object in which the sounds are first
fixed.
(emphasis added). Section 106(1) grants the owner of the musical work the right to "reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."
[97].  Section 115(a)(1).
[98].  Section 115(a)(1). The rate presently in effect is 7.1 cents per unit, or 1.35 cents per minute playing
time. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 63 Fed. Reg. 7288-89
(1998)(codified at 37 C.F.R. Part 255). This is the rate for traditional physical mechanical licenses.
Regardless of the statutory rate cap for a Section 115 mechanical license, the parties can always negotiate a
different rate. For example, record companies often offer only 75% of the statutory rate for traditional
phonorecords.
[99].   See Section 101: 
 
'Sound recordings' are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but
not including sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied. (emphasis
added).
[100].  Most often publishers receive the mechanical royalty, and record companies (publishers of the sound
recording) receive the royalty for the sale of the sound recording album. Usually, performance royalties are
collected by the societies, based upon formulas discussed supra note 31, and paid from the society to the
publisher or to the publishers and composers under royalty splits contained in song or co-publishing
contracts. The music publisher, or whoever is in charge of administering the exploitation of the composition
attempts to get the song reproduced and performed in as many ways as are economically advisable for the
type of composition. See KOHN, supra note 23, at 5-34 (publishing, licensing strategy).
[101].  See supra note 96.
[102].  Section 106(3) grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to "distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public...."
[103].  See supra note 96. See also WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 27-28.
[104].  The download of a copy of the musical work in the phonorecord is the same as the download of a
computer game in Sega Enterprises v. Maphia, 857 F.Supp.679 (N.D.Cal. 1994), involving the Section
106(1) reproduction right. See also Frank Music, supra note 59 (musical works contained in MIDI files were
uploaded and downloaded to a Compuserve bulletin board; the Harry Fox Agency and Music Publishers sued
on basis of infringement of reproduction right, the settlement included an agreement that such services must
now purchase mechanical licenses).
[105].  WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 64-65 ("...the placement of copyrighted material into a computer's
memory is a reproduction of that material."). When a digitized file is either uploaded or downloaded from or
to a user's computer via a bulletin board or similar server, or when a file is transferred, a copy is made.
[106].  See 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 308, second and third paragraphs. Kohn is saying the same thing
here, although he does not make it clear that this would be true even absent DPSRA.
[107].  Section 115(d) provides:
As used in this section, the following term has the following meaning: A 'digital phonorecord
delivery' is each individual delivery of a phonorecord which results in a specifically identifiable
reproduction by or for any transmission recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording,
regardless of whether the digital transmission is also a public performance of the sound recording
or any nondramatic musical work embodied therein. A digital phonorecord delivery does not
result from a real-time, non-interactive subscription transmission of a sound recording where no
reproduction of the sound recording or the musical work embodied therein is made from the
inception of the transmission through to its receipt by the transmission recipient in order to make
the sound recording audible. (emphasis added).
[108]. Id.
[109].  See supra note 91.
[110]. Distribution is not defined in the Copyright Act, except for its definition in Section 115(c)(2) which
provides, "...a phonorecord is considered 'distributed' if the person exercising the compulsory license has
voluntarily and permanently parted with its possession." If digital phonorecord deliveries are considered
copies, there is fear that under the first-sale doctrine, a recipient of a copy would somehow then have license
to further distribute that copy, and in the digital world this could mean infinite further deliveries of copies.
This does not necessarily follow, however, because the recipient having the equipment to copy a music album
to his own CD, or other personal media storage/playing device, could then share only his copy that way, and
is not any more bound to deliver it infinitely over the Internet than is someone today who chooses not to
infinitely copy cassette copies of albums. The argument that this is easier to accomplish digitally does not
mean music users have no choice. Also, the argument that first-sale could even be a problem should not
influence the decision whether a particular transmission is a performance. 
        The phonorecord distribution right under Section 115, the compulsory license for making phonorecords
of nondramatic musical works, is actually more limited than the distribution right accorded all copyrighted
works under Section 106(3), which includes distribution of phonorecords that may not contain musical
works.
[111].  The legislative history for the 1976 version of Section 115 is quite clear that the compulsory license is
available to reproduce the musical composition, thus invoking the Section 106(1) reproduction right. The
House Report regarding Section 115 also makes it clear that the reason Congress included the requirement
that the primary purpose for obtaining the license is for distribution to the public for private use was to allow
for negotiation of a different license and fee, called an electrical transcription license, for commercial uses of
music, such as background music, jukeboxes, and broadcasters, who would still require the copyright owner's
consent to record the musical work. This decision reflects the balance arrived at between public access to
musical works being recorded by different artists, and the business-to-business uses of purely commercial
music. See House Report, supra note 64, Section 115. See also KOHN, supra note 23, at 693 (electrical
transcription licenses).
[112].  Bob Kohn may be reaching the same conclusion, although he hedges. See 1999 Supp., supra note 48,
at 309-10. Kohn recently changed his position again, and now he clearly acknowledges the digital
phonorecord delivery contemplated in Section 115 will likely only only render a private first performance to
the recipient, if at all. Therefore, it is unlikely that a public performance of the musical works would occur at
the same time, and thus only a mechanical royalty would be paid on this transaction.
[113].  It is important to distinguish the performance right in the musical work under Section 106(4) from the
new performance right in the sound recording under Section 106(6), even though both the musical work and
the sound recording version of the work are contained in the same phonorecord, even for the purpose of a
digital phonorecord delivery under Section 115. Section 106(6) provides a new performance right for the
sound recording version contained on the phonorecord, the right to "perform the copyrighted work [the
copyrighted sound recording] publicly, by means of a digital transmission." Section 114 clearly states that the
performance right under Section 106(6) does not include the Section 106(4) performance right. But, Section
115(d) provides a digital phonorecord delivery may be effected by digital transmission of a sound recording,
regardless whether the same digital transmission is also a public performance of the sound recording.
Depending upon whether this means both the reproduction right and the performance right are implicated, the
problems discussed here regarding the digital performance of the musical work itself are further complicated.
Although a complete analysis of Section 114 and the sound recording performance right is impossible here, it
appears that the reproduction right must be implicated as it is in the musical works. Any other interpretation
would again fail to distinguish between the delivery of a reproduction of the sound recording contained on
the phonorecord, and its performance. This anomaly may have been overlooked by the drafters who were
primarily concerned with constructing rules making it less likely that easily copied performances or
downloads would go uncompensated. See 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 248. However, for such a
reproduction, the license purchased would be the sound recording master use license, not a mechanical
license under Section 115. Only in instances when it is entirely clear that the transmission is a performance of
both the sound recording and any musical work also performed by the sound recording should performance
licenses be required for both. See Section 114(d)(3)(B) (requiring interactive service licensee of performance
right in sound recording to obtain performance licenses for underlying musical works). See also 1999 Supp.,
supra note 48, at 310 (identifying problem in reverse: Harry Fox Agency claiming that every digital audio
transmission of a musical work by an interactive service is also a digital phonorecord delivery). See also
DMCA Section 112 (1998). In this recent amendment to the ephemeral recording requirement under Section
112, it is quite clear that it is necessary to make a phonorecord of a sound recording in order to deliver even
an ephemeral performance of the sound recording and necessarily any musical works therein. 
        Musical works performance royalties are collected by the societies or the copyright owner, usually a
publisher, and licenses from the societies may be granted only on a nonexclusive basis, with rates adjusted to
similarly situated users under the consent decrees. Mechanical licenses are granted by the copyright owner,
usually a publisher, or an agency like the Harry Fox Agency, but are affected by the statutory rate cap.
Royalties for performances of sound recordings will be collected from the owners of the sound recordings,
usually a record label, or its licensing representative, and may or may not be capped or voluntarily negotiated
under Section 114.
[114].  See 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 308-10.
[115].  This position was clearly considered during the various debates over how best to amend the Copyright
Act to distinguish between delivery of copies of works and deliveries of other transmissions. See Letter from
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to The Honorable Carlos J. Moorhead, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property, (April 1, 1996). In response to Rep. Moorhead's inquiry regarding
broadcasters' requests for an exemption to the NII bill, Peters says: 
 
"The bills would amend the distribution right to clarify that the distribution of copies of a work
to the public may be accomplished by means of transmission. Based on current technology, this
would not cover broadcasts any more than present law does, since a broadcast does not result in
copies being distributed to the public." Id. (emphasis added).
[116].  See Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir. 1995) (making it clear that in
the broadcasting context material vs. non-material transmission distinction is relevant in determining that
broadcaster could be performing work rather than distributing work). Broadcast context refers to non-material
transmission of a sound recording, whether or not it is also possible that dissemination of the work can occur
by transmission. Id.
[117].  See TROTTER HARDY, PROJECT LOOKING FORWARD: SKETCHING THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A
NETWORKEDWORLD 115 (Final Report Prepared for the Copyright Office, May 1998)(stream of bits played
as it arrives is most like radio) [hereinafter FORWARD].
[118].  Id.
[119].  DPSRA, Section 114. See also 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 243-47.
[120].  See 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 324-45 (Bob Kohn's "Webcasting Primer"). See also Digital Media
Association, What's In H.R.. 2281 for Webcasters?, (visited July 11, 1999)
<http://www.digmedia.org/2281exp.html>.
[121].  See 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 324-45. Kohn was correct that these performances were free, and
were completely exempt under the original DPSRA. The debate between Kohn and the RIAA, and the
resulting change by Congress taking place under the cloud of impending impeachment proceedings
demonstrates the corruption of the process determining music rights on the Internet. Although this paper
discusses and stresses performance rights generally administered by the performance rights societies, and
points to abuses of their powers, this latest DPSRA amendment illustrates how little the decisions made have
actually to do with any solid basis in copyright law and policy, much less any concern for public good. The
grasping for power over music played and otherwise delivered on the Internet appears to affect the collectives
and major organizations in the music industry as a whole, and is certainly not restricted to any one powerful
organization. Bob Kohn himself has also recently entered the webcasting business.
[122].  See Eric S. Slater, Note, Broadcasting On the Internet: Legal Issues for Traditional and Internet-Only
Broadcasters, 6 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 25, 26 (1997) (First permanent cybercast of a traditional radio station
began in 1995; number of stations increased 900% by end of 1996). Slater lists Internet radio listing sites:
MIT Internet Guide to Radio Stations (visited July 11, 1999) <http://wmbr.mit.edu/stations/list.html>; see
also(visited July 11, 1999) <http://www-kzsu.stanford.edu/radio.html>; (visited July 11, 1999)
<http://www.rronline.com>.
[123].  See Marc E. Mayer, Do International Internet Sound Recording Infringements Implicate U.S.
Copyright Law?, 15 COMPUTER L. 11, 12-14 (1998) (identifying and discussing how broadcast model
"dichotomy" between broadcaster as performer and recipient as reciever, and multiple performance doctrine
leads to varying conclusions about what can be a public performance on the Internet; traditional doctrines
based on geographic locations are increasingly inadequate to protect copyright in new technological
environments). As a result of similar concerns, the European Community Council created new right of
communication to the public by satellite, identifying the act of communication as where satellite signals are
introduced into chain of communication. Id.
[124].  House Report, supra note 64, at 64 ("...if the transmission reaches the public in my[sic] form, the case
comes within the scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106").
[125].  See id. at 63: 
 
...Although any act by which the initial performance or display is transmitted, repeated, or made
to recur would itself be a 'performance' or 'display' under the bill, it would not be actionable as an
infringement unless it were done 'publicly,' as defined in Section 101. Certain other performances
and displays, in addition to those that are 'private,' are exempted or given qualified copyright
control under Sections 107 through 108.
[126].  ASCAP Comments, supra note 49. See also Yvonne A. Tamayo, Who? What? When? Where?:
Personal Jurisdiction and the World Wide Web, 4 RICH. J.L.& TECH. 7, (1998),
<http://www.richmond.edu/~jolt/v4i3/tamayo.html>, (discussing cases bringing out distinction between
"passive" and "interactive" websites for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction).
[127].  See FORWARD, supra at 117, at 18 (because technology is rapidly changing, allowing for different
environments on the Internet, when a posting is "public" is slippery slope issue that is most difficult in
copyright where the definition of public is tied to physical places). See also Marc E. Mayer, Do Internet
Sound Recording Infringements Implicate U.S. Copyright Law?, 15 COMPUTER L. 11, at 12-14 (1998)
(discussing problem of identifying venue of performance on the Internet and comparing two main existing
theories based upon geographical location of either performer or recipient(s)). Problems occur because if
performance is assessed by physical place of origination, then for example, performance occurring in foreign
country but heard in U.S. can not be assessed performance royalties in U.S. ASCAP does not even enforce
copyrights in U.S. for those presently occurring traditional transmissions. But if the performance occurs at the
place of reception, then that means infringement can occur at any actual or potential place of receipt. This is
like the Bogsch Theory applied to satellite transmissions, where infringement occurs wherever the "footprint"
of a satellite falls, where unauthorized performances. Id.
[128]. See WHITE PAPER, supra note  48, at 72; FORWARD supra note 117, at 121 (unauthorized posting of
work on website is an infringement, even if not clear which right); 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 106-112
(examples of scenarios where website transmissions implicate performance rights); Nancy A. Bloom,
Protecting Copyright Owners of Digital Music-No More Free Access to Cyber Tunes, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 179, 193-99 (posting a song on website may be considered public performance).
[129]. "Celestial jukebox" is term used by GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16. Of course if "pay-per-listen" celestial
jukeboxes are to be part of the new model, a consideration of the application of Section 116 negotiated
licenses may also be necessary, but not in addition to a broadcast-like performance license. See also 1999
Supp., supra note 48, at 97 (advocating "pay-per-listen" musical works performance delivery).
[130]. The criteria of a "receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes" could easily apply
now to any personal computer system. See Section 110(5).
[131]. See John Wilk, Seeing the Words and Hearing the Music: Contradictions in the Construction of 17
U.S.C. Section 110(5), 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 783 (1993) (identifying the impossibility of discerning a
consistent standard in courts' application of Section 110(5) tests for square footage, type of receiving
apparatus, and further transmission to the public and concluding that tests are virtually meaningless); see also
Lilenfield, supra note 17, at 704 n.35 (citing numerous authorities describing the extensive problems
interpreting and applying Section 110(5)).
[132]. Fairness, supra note 38.
[133]. 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
[134]. 117 S.Ct. 2329 at 2334 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
[135]. The Court found portions of the CDA unconstitutional, Id.
[136]. 117 S.Ct. 2329 at 2343 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
[137]. Id. at 2335, 2343.
[138]. But see 117 S.Ct. 2329 at 2353. In her concurrence and dissent, Justice O'Connor disagrees with the
majority by thinking that the Internet must have geography because it can be zoned so that users can screen
out locations, by means of fixed Internet addresses. However, the very fact that technological screening can
take place means that there is no universal geography to the Internet. It also means that technological means
designed to obscure locations and content on the Internet make it even less likely that venue for performance
right purposes can be easily identified under existing geographic copyright rules. See also FORWARD, supra
note 117, at 172 (ways to mask origination of Internet transmissions).
[139]. See Prophet Music v. Shamla Oil Co., 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 7839, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1554; Copy.
L. Rep. (CCH) para. 27, 113 (D. Minn. 1993)(granting statutory damages for infringement and permanent
injunction in holding that music delivered to gas station's telephone customers via music-on-hold system
connected to station's radio receiver was public performance under Section 101 definitions of perform,
transmit, and publicly, and House Report-suit brought by ASCAP members). See also Lisa Zhito, Music
licensing fees, liability issues among concerns of PAC mgrs. at IAAM, ASAP (Vol. 106, No. 34, August 22,
1994) at 10 (discussing ways performing arts center managers can avoid liability for infringing performance
right for music on hold).
[140]. A few possibilities include: analog broadcast-tower-(waves)-receiver, cable headend-cable wires-
converter box/tv, satellite dish-headend-cable wires-converter box/tv, satellite dish-wire-(direct video)-
satellite receiver/tv, and analog or digital broadcast tower-wireless-receiver.
[141]. FORWARD, supra note 117, at 218 (indicating copyright and communication law may not be
independent of each other).
[142]. The history of cable broadcasting and copyright is illustrative of the problem defining scope of rights
by technological parameters. While the regulation and law of cable, and other satellite or hybrid systems is
worthy of a textbook-sized effort, a few examples of how definitions resulting in colliding categories arose
shows how massive the current Internet definitional problems could become. For example, the FCC regulates
the cable industry, but copyright covers some retransmissions of content by cable systems. The copyright
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broadcasters, and other copyright owners. The compromise gave cable systems greater latitude in what they
could carry in exchange for their agreement to pay royalties. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36
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copyright definitions. See Cable Compulsory License: Definition of Cable Systems, 56 F.R. 31580, 31592-93
(July 11, 1991); Satellite Broadcasting & Communications Assoc. v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344 (11th Cir. 1994)
(affirming Copyright Office definition of "cable system"). This controversy led to the passage of the Satellite
Home Viewer Act of 1988,  Section 119 of the Copyright Act, which made compulsory licensing available to
satellite systems. The controversy continues today. See [new proposed satellite act cite]. See also Patrick
Murphy, Retransmission Consent: A Mixed Signal for Cable Copyright, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237
(1993).
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Zislis, How TV-Based Internet Service Can Be Delivered Over a Cable Network, COMPUTER TECH. 104
(December 1998), Internet protocol (IP) telephony over cable, see Wade Carter, Launch A Telephony Winner,
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service itself."); Tom Girard & Charles Paikert, Cable and Internet: Friends or Foes?, CABLEVISION, Oct.
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supra note 122, at 32.
[146]. See House Report, supra note 64, at 89 (explaining that because the 1976 Act changed the law and
now requires cable broadcasters to pay copyright royalties for retransmissions of works to paying subscribers,
compulsory license is appropriate method for balancing policy between copying concerns and business
reality).
[147]. See Section 111(a)(3) (Copyright Act exempts passive carriers who simply retransmit and exercise no
control over content or selection of protected material; FCC decides who is classified a passive carrier). See
also FUTURE, supra note 144, at 25-36 (history of common carrier provisions of Communications Act); see
also FORWARD, supra note 117, at 221-24.
[148]. Id. See also In the Matter of GTE Telephone Operating Cos., F.C.C. Order No. 98-292 (CC Docket No.
98-79 Oct. 30, 1998) (Commnr's Furchtgott-Roth and Tristani dissenting in part and issuing a joint statement)
(GTE new Internet access service that permits Internet Service Providers to give their end-user customers
high-speed access to the Internet ("ASDL" dedicated connection) is an interstate service subject to tariff at
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MUSIC ON HOLD CASE, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 397 (1998)(Analysing and discussing Telestra Corp. Ltd.
v. Australasian Performing Rights Ass'n, 146 A.L.R. 649 (1997)(under Australian Copyright Act,
communications carrier that serves only as conduit for transmission of infringing material can be liable for
copyright infringement).
[149]. DMCA Section 114.
[150]. H.Rep. No. 105-796, at 83 (1998)(DMCA Section 114).
[151]. See MIDI Manufactures Association Site, What is MIDI? (visited July 12, 1999)
<http://www.midi.org/abtmidi.htm.>.
[152]. Id.; see also Eric Lipscomb, The Method of MIDI (visited July 12,1999)
<http://server.music.vt.edu/technology/Intromidi/midimethod.html>; Did U Know? (visited July 12,1999)
<http://www.windytown.com/featured.html>, (for simplified explanations).
[153]. See Lipscomb, supra note 152 ("[t]wo synthesizers communicate via MIDI").
[154]. Id.; See also 1999 Supp., supra note 48, at 6 (describing components of MIDI system).
[155]. Id. at 11; "Copyright Office Affirms that MIDI Musical Data is Subject fo Mechanical Compuslory
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[157]. See ABKO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, 96 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1996)(defendant's karaoke CD+G's,
containing music and timed lyrics in graphic display not subject to Section 115 compulsory license). See also
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to operate the written function of music notation very much like a word processor. Notes can be dragged and dropped, music can be
cut and pasted, etc. The interfaces can also translate recorded music into audible sound and written notation. A new version of Finale,
used by music publishing houses today to do everything from transposing to arranging music now employs a new feature that allows
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See Promotion of Distance Education Through Digital Technologies, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,167 (1998).
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from an Internet service provider, under Sony the question would be whether the broadcast material itself were free, not the conduit
itself. Id.; see contra Bloom, supra note 50, at 189.
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